“Removing and Regulating” – Getting Rickshaws Out of Mumbai

By Sachin Desai

In most developing cities, traditional public transit is uncoordinated, unoptimized, and although gets people from place to place, creates a host of social problems doing so.  It starts to “parasite” off the expanding city.  In Bogota, local busses, old and poorly managed, not only starved new city roads and choked Bogota’s air, but also hindered BRT development.  However, “regulating and removing” these busses proved hard politically and economically.

However, can we learn from Mumbai? In a place where coordinated local action seems almost impossible (see Dharavi case), the government has had one success – regulating (and removing) auto-rickshaws.  These three-wheel motorized carts emerged to move people in the old city, but like the busses in Bogota, are today arguably more a nuisance instead of a help.  They do not follow road rules, creating traffic problems affecting all types of vehicles.  They have a high accident and fatality rate.[1] They are also hard to remove, with over 200,000 drivers and multiple unions.[2]

But auto-rickshaws have been successfully “regulated,” forcibly converted to cleaner CNG, something that would seem hard to do in Bogota.[3]  They have also been “removed”  from central Mumbai, limited now to the suburbs.[4]   Mumbai’s government is aggressively scrapping unlicensed rickshaws.[5]  This has helped modern taxis take their place, improving safety, exposure to pollution, and travel times.  Mumbai’s new infrastructure now does not suffer parasitic losses from slow-moving and wirey Rickshaws.

How is this possible?  Lessons from Mumbai can apply not just in Bogota, but any time an old transit economy has to be swapped in for new.  From my research, here are a few potential reasons Mumbai succeeded:

  • The government has challenged rickshaw economics.   Costs on rickshaws have been slowly ratcheted up.  Drivers complain of new 1-time taxes on rickshaws.[6]  The government aggressively restricts rickshaw rates, limiting profit.[7]  The government aggressively polices these rates.[8]
  • Mumbai created competition.  The government has subsidized taxis, which, unlike busses or metros, can directly compete with rickshaws.[9]
  • Sometimes, one arm of the government funds things while the other tries to stop it.  In Bogota the government appears to still give out concessions to local busses.  The Mumbai government used to give loans for rickshaws, and now they have stopped.[10]
  • Importantly, the government has gone directly on the offensive.  Multiple government reports attack the safety[11] and environmental performance of rickshaws.[12]  Their fare honesty has been challenged, despite the fact that fares are cheap and drivers complain it’s a smear campaign.[13]  Public leaders directly call for bans.[14]  There are strong government efforts to monitor and fine rickshaws, and to promote riders to complain against rickshaws.[15]Rickshaw drivers today believe the people are against them.[16]

Takeaways:  First, maybe the “regulate and remove” system is possible in developing-country democracies.  If Mumbai can win against a large, organized, populist-oriented group, ANYONE can do it.  Second, it may change whether we build a BRT or MRT in Avenida Septima.  If a major policy goal is to remove a damaging but entrenched system, the answer may be direct engagement.  A BRT can compete directly with local busses.  MRTs likely cannot stop as often, and are expensive, allowing local busses to differentiate on price.  It may be better to spend that MRT money on subsidizing the BRTs to price-parity with the local busses, on a PR campaign attacking the safety and pollution record of local busses, aggressively buying/eliminating bus concessions, and on increasing monitoring and complaint mechanisms against local busses.

Desai Rickshaw

Image: Auto-Rickshaw

[1] Mumbai Auto Rickshaws May No Longer Be a Sure Thing, The National (Mar. 13, 2010), http://www.thenational.ae/lifestyle/motoring/mumbai-auto-rickshaws-may-no-longer-be-a-sure-thing.  “However [while other Mumbai drivers have become safer], accidents involving two wheelers and auto rickshaws have shot up. While only 1,477 two-wheeler accidents were reported in 1971, the number crossed the 5,000 mark in 2008.” Mumbaikars Have Become Safer Drivers, Reveals MMRDA Report, DNA India (Mar. 19, 2010), http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report_mumbaikars-have-become-safer-drivers-reveals-mmrda-report_1361081.  See also India Unions Urge Mumbai Rickshaws Makeover, BBC News (May 17, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13427774.

[2] See BBC News, supra note 1; Proposed Auto Rickshaw Strike Called Off in Mumbai, India Today (Nov 1, 2011), http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/proposed-auto-rickshaw-strike-called-off-in-mumbai/1/158254.html.

[3] May 31 Deadline for CNG Conversion, Times of India (Apr. 11, 2002), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2002-04-11/mumbai/27143092_1_taxi-unions-three-wheelers-cng.  Given the strike discussed in India Today, supra note 2, it appears that most rickshaws to use CNG today.

[4] Taken from personal experience.  See also Public Transport in Mumbai, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_transport_in_Mumbai#Auto_rickshaws (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).

[5] See Small Four-Wheelers To Replace Three-Wheelers In Mumbai, The Automotive Horizon (Nov. 9, 2010),  http://automotivehorizon.sulekha.com/small-four-wheelers-to-replace-three-wheelers-in-mumbai_11_2010_postedby_jayashankar-menon.

[6] Audi, Move Interviews – Two Auto-Rickshaw Drivers, The Challenges of Navigating Mumbai 3-4 (Jan. 3, 2013), available at http://audi-urban-future-initiative.com/mooove_cms/resources/media/pdf/auto-rickshaw-drivers.pdf.

[7] Id.

[8] 97 Of 150 Rickshaw Meters Tampered With: Andheri RTO, Hindustan Times (Sep. 19, 2011), http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/Mumbai/97-of-150-rickshaw-meters-tampered-with-Andheri-RTO/Article1-747445.aspx.

[9] The Automotive Horizon, supra note 5; Mumbai Not So Cool Cabs Air Conditioned Taxis, Mid-Day.Com (Oct. 2012), http://www.mid-day.com/news/2012/oct/031012-mumbai-Not-so-cool-cabs-air-conditioned-taxis.htm.

[10] Audi, supra note 6, at 5.

[11] See e.g., The Automotive Horizon, supra note 5, DNA India, supra note 1.

[12] The Role of Auto Rickshaws in Modern Indian Cities, The City Fix (Mar. 24, 2010), http://thecityfix.com/blog/the-role-of-auto-rickshaws-in-modern-indian-cities/.

[13] Hindustan Times, supra note 8.

[14] The National, supra note 1. See also Dehli Plans Ban On Autorickshaws, Guardian UK (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/mar/18/delhi-plans-ban-autorickshaws. This forces strikes, which erode public support for rickshaws.  Auto Drivers Face Sena’s Wrath, NDTV (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.ndtv.com/article/cities/mumbai-auto-drivers-face-sena-s-wrath-138945; Audi, supra note 6, at 4.

[15] Is the Auto Rickshaw strike justified?, The Complete Mumbai Guide, http://www.in-mumbai.com/2011/09/is-auto-rickshaw-strike-justified.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).

[16] Audi, supra note 6, at 5.


Solutions to Slums – Redevelopment, Removal or Upgrading

By Adelyn Zhou

The class discussion on the Dharavi redevelopment project was extremely interesting because it highlighted the interdependencies and conflicting agendas of the various constituents.  The government (city vs. state vs. federal), public (Dharavi residents, Mumbai residents), private (developers), and non-profit (social workers, NGOs, etc.) sectors all held differing perspectives on the best way to redevelop valuable slum land in the middle of Mumbai.  Slum upgrading is a very controversial and challenging topic; the numerous issues of this Dharavi redevelopment project have caused it to be currently on hold.  Therefore, it is interesting to examine how other countries such as China and Brazil, home to the largest and 3rd largest slum populations in the world respectively are dealing with their slums.


Given its autocratic government system, China uses a heavy-handed slum removal approach.  Migrant workers squatting on illegal land face the constant threat of home demolition.  For example, in preparation for the 2008 Olympics, the government bulldozed numerous slums for city beautification.  However, when surveyed, fewer than 10% of the affected slum residents planned to return to their home region; they were instead going to relocate to new locations only a bit further on the city outskirts.  The “hu kou” ID system in China requires all residents to be registered, which thereby prevents migrant workers from qualifying for low cost housing.  This policy has drawn a lot of criticism because many people are left homeless and without alternatives.


Brazil also leads the world in the number of residents living in favelas (slums), famous for being home to illegal drug trades and gang violence.  Starting in 2001, Brazil began enacting a practice of slum upgrading rather than eradication – improving the conditions in a slum rather than removing it completely.  It created a “zones of special interest” that formally recognized a slum’s existence and qualified it for social services.  It also authorized the creation of joint citizen-government councils to help govern these areas.  As Rio prepares for the 2014 World Cup, it is investing millions into improving the infrastructure in its slums (e.g. schools, hospitals, water and sewage systems), while dually sending in police to break up the drug cartels.  So far, this policy has met with relatively positive results.

No slum upgrading approach is without criticism – a panacea for slums has yet to be found.  However, projects that have a high degree of public involvement and a strong social demand seem to lead to greater success.   Furthermore, integrated development programs with social components (education, healthcare) are more successful over the long run.

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In the process of my research, I also came across this article.  It interestingly compares Tokyo’s development from a slum post WWII with Dharavi which some folks in the class might find interesting.  http://nextcity.org/informalcity/entry/when-tokyo-was-a-slum